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The doctrine of the principal case will therefore never operate again to defeat a testator's wishes in cases of charitable trusts. The decision now upheld is criticised in 10 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 445.

TRUSTS — LIABILITY OF TRUSTEE — PLEADING. — Where an action was brought against trustees as such for an injury arising from their negligence in caring for the trust premises, *held*, they were not liable as trustees, and an amendment to charge them personally was not permissible, as it would be a new cause of action. *Keating v. Stevenson*, 47 N. Y. Supp. 847.

The decision is correct in holding that at common law the trustees were liable only in their individual capacity as legal owners of property. The common law does not recognize a trustee as trustee. The court dismissed the action on the ground that judgment against defendants as trustees must necessarily be satisfied out of the trust estate and a trustee cannot be allowed to charge the *res* with a personal liability due to his own mismanagement of the trust. But there is no statute in New York making a judgment against a trustee a charge upon the estate, such as has been passed there and in other States in case of executors and administrators. Mass. Pub. Stats. c. 166, § 8; Bliss' N. Y. Code, § 1814. Therefore the judgment at law against the trustees, though named as such, is against them as individuals merely. It is not a charge upon the trust estate, for this the common law does not, unless compelled by statute, recognize. The description as trustees is mere surplusage, an amendment is unnecessary. *Shepard* v. *Creamer*, 160 Mass. 496; *Odd Fellows Assoc.* v. *McAllister*, 153 Mass. 296. Under the above-mentioned statutes applying to executors and administrators the words of description would of course not be surplusage. *Yarrington* v. *Robinson*, 141 Mass. 450.

REVIEWS.

BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY. By John Bouvier. New edition, by Francis Rawle. Volume I. Boston: Boston Book Co. pp. xviii, 1125.

Though only the first half of Mr. Rawle's latest revision of Bouvier's Dictionary has been published, the quality of the work can be well judged from what is now at hand. When a work is so well known to the profession, as is this law dictionary in the many editions through which it has passed, it is difficult to say anything new about it, more especially when a former edition has been prepared by the same editor. The latest previous issue of this work, however, came out in 1883, so that evidently the present one ought to be to a very large extent a new book; and so it is, as to a fourth of the whole, while still keeping within the limits of two volumes of a reasonable dictionary size. The additions appear to be largely in the direction of a legal encyclopædia, particularly as to the less technical parts of the law. There is an immense amount of reading in it that will be of interest to the layman as well as the lawyer, such as the articles on Elections, Eminent Domain, and several topics in Constitutional Law. To the lawyer, the completeness of the work as a dictionary, the accuracy of the definitions, and the character of the references, must be the most important points. A hurried examination of this first volume seems to show that it does not in these respects fall below the standard of excellence which might be expected of Mr. Rawle. No work of this sort will ever be perfectly complete. A test of the completeness of a law dictionary, it has been suggested, is whether it explains the nature of a Common *Condidit*. This latest work does not do this; but it is, comparatively speaking, the most comprehensive yet published. It is the product of great industry and wide legal learning; and as such it is likely, owing to the continual demand for works of this character, to receive a very hearty appreciation. R. G.